We introduce a general notion of maturity in social networks that is based on the number of triangles between groups/communities. In order to protect individual privacy upon possible release of such information, we propose privacy mechanisms using zero-knowledge privacy (ZKP), a recently proposed privacy scheme that provides stronger protection than differential privacy (DP) for socialgraph data. We present techniques to compute the parameters required to design ZKP methods and finally evaluate the practicality of the proposed methods.
INTRODUCTION
Complex graphs of real world networks have been studied from different aspects. One of the important properties of networks is connectivity, overall or partial. Various measures, such as counting the number of triangles or other simple subgraphs, have been used to characterize connectivity. Connectivity measures can reveal valuable information about networks. For instance, the number of triangles in a graph can indicate how much a graph looks like a social network or how mature a network is (cf. [1] ). When a social network is in its early ages pairwise friendship connections are prevalent. As the network grows and activity level increases, individuals increasingly consider establishing friendships with friends of friends, thus forming more triangular connections.
In this paper we consider triangles between groups. More specifically, we are interested in the number of (u, v, w) triangles, where u, v, and w are people in groups g, g , and g , respectively, and where these groups are not necessarily pair-wise disjoint. This triangle-based measure is quite general. For example, if g = g = g , the measure gives the number of triangles formed by the members of a single group. Another useful specialization is when g ∩ g = ∅. Then, our measure gives the bridgeness of g 's elements with respect to g and g (see [2] ).
Graph measures, similar to other types of aggregate information, are usually released to third parties for different purposes. The release of such information can violate the privacy of individuals in networks. Among the wide range of definitions and schemes presented to protect data privacy, -Differential Privacy [4, 5, 6] (DP for short) has attracted significant attention in recent years. By adding appropriate noise to the output of a function, DP makes it practically impossible to infer the presence of an individual or a relationship in a database using the released information. While DP stays resilient to many attacks on tabular data, it might not provide sufficient protection in the case of graph data, particularly social networks (cf. [7, 8] ). Because of the extensive correlation between the nodes in social networks, not only the participation of a node (or relationship), but also the evidence of such participation has to be protected. This requires a higher level of protection than what DP offers (cf. [8] ).
We explain the matter using an example. Suppose there are three groups of nodes g, g , and g in a social graph G. We want to publish the number of triangles between these three groups. Let us assume for this example that there is only one person Eve in g .
Suppose that Bob in g is connected to Alice in g , and both are connected to Eve in g (a triangle). As a consequence of these relationships, some of Bob's friends make connections to Alice and Eve, thus creating new triangles. What we want to protect is the existence of Bob's connection to Alice (call it the BAconnection). Namely, the privacy of the BA-connection is protected by devising a privacy mechanism that distorts the true answer in a randomized way so that it becomes practically impossible for an attacker to infer whether we have used the original database or the slightly modified version of it where the BA-connection has been removed.
From a counting perspective the existence or not of the BA-connection can change the number of triangles by at most 1. DP works in this case by ensuring that for any true answer, c or c − 1, the privatized answer would be pretty much the same. However, this is not strong enough; the existence of Bob's connections influenced the true number of triangles between the three groups not just by 1, but by a bigger number as it caused more triangles to be created by Bob's friends.
In order to provide sufficient data privacy for social graphs, Gehrke, Lui, and Pass proposed "zeroknowledge privacy" (ZKP) in [7] . The definition of ZKP is based on classes of aggregate functions. ZKP guarantees that any additional information that an attacker can obtain about an individual by having access to the sanitized output is indistinguishable from what can be inferred from some sampling-based aggregate.
In ZKP, the sample size k has to be selected wisely. To protect even the evidence of a person's participation the sampling has to be such that, with high probability, very few of the person's neighboring individuals get selected by random sampling.
For instance, suppose in the Bob's example above the network size is 10,000 and the sample size is 3 10, 000 2 = 464. With such a sampling rate of almost 0.05 the evidence provided by say 10 more triangles caused by Bob's connections will essentially be protected; with a high probability, none of these 10 triangles will be in the sample.
In this paper, we formally define a group-based triangle (GBT) measure in social networks and present a ZKP mechanism to provide connection privacy upon release of such information. Specifically, our first contribution is deriving a general formula to compute the GBT measure, such that it works for any assemblage of node groups. In the second part, we propose methods to compute the sample complexity of the triangle count function. In order to achieve this, we present techniques to express the function as an average of specially designed, synthetic attributes on the nodes of graphs. This is one of the main challenges to be able to use the Hoeffding inequality and the fundamental ZKP proposition (See Proposition 4.1) for GBT measure. Then, we derive precise prescriptions on how to construct ZKP mechanisms for the function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we define our notion of group-based triangles (GBT). Section 4 contains a discussion of the background concepts related to zero-knowledge privacy. In Section 4, we present ZKP mechanisms for releasing GBT measures. We also present our methods to compute the sample complexity of GBT. Section 6 presents a numeric evaluation of the ZKP mechanism, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
The common goal of privacy preserving methods is to learn from data while protecting sensitive information of the individuals (cf. [9, 10, 11, 12] ). k-anonymity for social graphs (cf. [13, 14, 16] ) provides privacy by ensuring that combinations of identifying attributes appear at least k times in the dataset. The problem with k-anonymity and other related approaches, e.g. l-diversity [17] , is that they assume the adversary has limited auxiliary knowledge.
Narayanan and Shmatikov [18] presented a de-anonymization algorithm and claimed that k-anonymity can be defeated by their method using auxiliary information accessible by the adversary.
Among a multitude of different techniques, differential privacy (DP) [4, 5, 19, 20] has become one of the leading methods to provide individual privacy. Various differentially private algorithms have since been developed for different domains, including social networks [21, 22] . However, DP can suffer in social networks where specific auxiliary information, such as graph structure and friendship data, is easily available to the adversary. Important works showing the shortcomings of DP are [8, 23, 3] .
Gehrke, Lui, and Pass in [7] present the notion of zero-knowledge privacy that is appealing for achieving privacy in social networks. Zero-knowledge privacy (ZKP) guarantees that what can be learned from a dataset including an individual is not more than what can be learned from sampling-based aggregates computed on the dataset without that individual.
Works [2, 24] use ZKP to release connectedness and bridgeness statistics in social networks. They are different from the current work, where we aim at privately releasing group-based triangle counts for social networks. Specifically, [24] is about ZKP-Graph Summarization (ZKP-GS). It considers some statistics in graphs which involve edges between one or two groups. If intuitively we assume #edges(g, g ) > #triangles(g, g , g ), in a similar circumstance this results in a smaller noise scale. Furthermore, ZKP-GS has different techniques than current paper to compute the sample complexity of corresponding functions.
GRAPHS, GROUPS, AND TRIANGLES
We denote a graph as G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges connecting the nodes. We consider S ⊂ 2 V to be a set of node groups of size r or more that a social network wants to release statistics about. Let g, g , and g be three groups in S.
Definition 3.1. The group-based triangle (GBT) measure of g, g , and g is defined as
) is the fraction of the number of actual triangles between the nodes of different groups over the number of all possible such triangles. Throughout the paper, we will refer to
GBT (g, g , g ) as GBT whenever g, g , and g are clear from the context.
The definition of GBT is quite general. It contains as special cases simpler triangle-based measures used in literature. For example, by setting g = g = g = V , we obtain the total number of triangles in the network (cf. [1, 25, 26, 27] ).
To facilitate the exposition and derivation of some equations, we will also use occasionally g 1 , g 2 , g 3 to refer to groups. This is the case for the rest of this section.
Example 1. Fig. 1 shows a graph G with three groups g 1 , g 2 , and g 3 , having three, two, and two nodes, respectively. There are three edges connecting the nodes of g 1 and g 2 , and four edges connecting g 3 to g 1 and g 2 . These edges form two triangles in total between groups g 1 , g 2 , and g 3 . The number of all possible triangles between three groups is 10 (See Proposition 3.1). Therefore, we have GBT = 0.2.
We derive in the following a formula to compute the maximum number of triangles that can exist between any three groups. The set of all valid triangles is denoted by L, where each triangle is represented by a node triplet (u, v, w). |L| is the denominator in the definition of GBT.
Let g 1 , g 2 , and g 3 be three groups with possible intersections. We consider the following notation, as illustrated in Fig. 2 , for all possible disjoint subsets created by the intersections between the groups.
where i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i = j, j = k, and i = k. Note that the subset indices are commutative, e.g., s ij = s ji . With slight abuse of notation, we will use s ij to denote the size of the s ij set as well.
Proposition 3.1. The maximum number of triangles between three node groups is computed by the equation in Table 1 . Term (1a) counts the number of triangles having at least two vertices in only one group (each to a separate group). That is, they are not in the areas of intersection with other groups. The third vertex has to be in any of the subsets of the third group, including the intersections with the other two groups. The coefficients and the subtraction take care of the repetitions occurring in the summation.
Term (1b) considers the triangles having at least two vertices in distinctive intersections of any two groups. Since these two vertices can be assumed to be in any of the three groups, the third vertex can be in any of the other subsets.
Term (1c) gives the number of possible triangles in which one vertex is in only one group, the other vertex is in the intersection of any two groups, and the third one is in all three groups.
Two vertices of a triangle can both be placed in the intersection of any two groups. Such triangles are counted by term (1d). The third vertex has to be in any of the subsets of the third group. Similarly, (1e) counts the number of triangles with two vertices in s 123 , the intersection of all three groups.
As vertices in s 123 belong to all groups, triangles can reside entirely, with all three vertices, inside this subset, counted by (1f).
Example 2. In Fig. 1 the total number of possible triangles is computed as follows. We have s 1 = 2, s 2 = 1, s 3 = 2, s 12 = 1, and s 13 = s 23 = s 123 = 0. Therefore, the only term that is not zero is (3.1) computed as the following.
BACKGROUND ON -ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PRIVACY
Zero-Knowledge Privacy (ZKP), introduced by [7] , is an enhanced privacy scheme that guarantees stronger privacy protection, compared to other currently wellknown methods such as differential privacy (DP), especially in social networks. Due to the extensive influence in such networks, the presence of a single element (node or connection) can lead to the creation of several new elements in the network. Therefore, in such a setting a privacy mechanism needs to protect not only the participation of an element in the network, but also the evidence of such a participation, i.e. the presence of new elements created under the influence of the element in focus.
ZKP requires that whatever an intelligent agent (adversary) can discover from the sanitized output of the mechanism is not more than what can be discovered by an equally gifted agent that only has access to some sample-based aggregate information. The latter agent is sometimes referred as simulator.
Let G be a graph. We denote by G − * a graph obtained from G by removing a piece of information (for example an edge). G and G − * are called neighboring graphs.
Let M be the privacy mechanism that securely releases the answer to a query on graph G, and let A be the intelligent agent that operates on output M (G), that is, privatized answer, trying to breach the privacy of some individual. Let S be a simulator as capable as A, that would have access to some aggregate information obtained by an algorithm T ∈ agg. Note that, the assumed algorithm T only would compute approximate answers to aggregate functions by sampling graph G − * , i.e. the graph that misses the piece of information which should be protected.
Definition 4.1. (Zero-Knowledge Privacy [7] ) The mechanism M is -zero-knowledge private with respect to agg if there exists a T ∈ agg such that for every adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that for every G, every z ∈ {0, 1} * , and every W ⊆ {0, 1} * , the following hold:
where probabilities are taken over the randomness of M and A, and T and S.
This definition assumes that both the adversary and simulator have access to some general and easily accessible auxiliary information z, such as graph structures or the groups the individuals belong in.
Note that, based on the application settings the selection of k -the sample size-in agg algorithms is very important. It should be chosen so that with high probability very few of the elements (nodes or edges) related with the element whose information has to be private will be chosen. We will often index agg by k as agg k to stress the importance of k. To satisfy the ZKP definition, a mechanism should use k = o(n), say k = √ n or k = 3 √ n 2 , where n, the number of nodes in the database, is sufficiently large (see [7] ). DP is a special case of ZKP where k = n.
Achieving ZKP. Let f : G → R m be a function that produces a vector of length m from a graph database. For example, given graph G, and the set of node groups S, f produces GBT for m triplets of groups. We consider the L 1 -Sensitivity to be defined as follows.
for all neighboring graphs G and G .
Another essential definition is that of "sample complexity". complexity with respect to agg if there exists an algorithm T ∈ agg such that for every D ∈ Dom we have
T is said to be a (δ, β)-sampler for f with respect to agg.
This definition bounds the probability of error between the randomized computation (approximation) of function f and the expected output of f . Functions with low sample complexity (smaller δ and β) can be computed more accurately using random samples from the input data.
When the released information, as typical, is real numbers, the ZKP mechanism San achieves the privacy by adding noise to each of the numbers independently.
Let Lap(λ) be the zero-mean Laplace distribution with scale λ, and variance 2λ
2 . The scale of Laplace noise in ZKP is properly calibrated to the sample complexity of the function that is to be privately computed. The following proposition expresses the relationship between the sample complexity of a function and the level of zero knowledge privacy achieved by adding Laplace noise to the outputs of the function.
has (δ, β)-sample complexity with respect to agg. Then, mechanism
where G ∈ G, and X j Lap(λ) for j = 1, · · · , m independently, is
-ZKP with respect to agg.
ZKP MECHANISM FOR GBT MEASURE
In this section we design an -ZKP mechanism to privately release GBT measures. Let f be the function that given graph G and set S produces a c-dimensional vector of GBT measures (numbers), where c ≤ |S| 3 . Let f = [f 1 , . . . , f t ] be the vector that is to be privately released. We apply a separate San i (ZKP) mechanism, for i ∈ [1, t], to each of the elements of f . Let us assume that each San i provides i -ZKP for f i with respect to agg ki , where k i = k(n)/t and n = |V |. Then, based on the following proposition, f will be t i=1 i -ZKP with respect to agg k(n) , where
, is an i -ZKP mechanism with respect to agg ki . Then, the mechanism resulting from composing
Consider G and G −e , where G −e is a neighboring graph of G obtained from G by removing edge e. The goal of our mechanism is to protect the privacy of the connections between the nodes of different groups upon release of GBT counts. Therefore, we assume that the removed edge e is an edge between two nodes of two different groups in S. To compute the sensitivity of GBT measures, we consider two extreme cases; first the case when the three node groups are pairwise disjoint, and second when they are identical. In the first case, removing an edge between two node groups g and g can change by at most |g| the numerator of GBT (g, g , g ) in G −e .
Hence, the sensitivity of the GBT function in this case is ∆ 1 (GBT ) = max |g| |g|·|g |·|g | = 1 r 2 where r is the minimum group size in S. Note that the denominator is the maximum number of valid triangles when all three groups are disjoint.
In the second case when the groups are identical, g = g = g , the sensitivity is ∆ 2 (GBT ) = max
r(r−1) . Therefore, the overall sensitivity of GBT function is ∆(GBT ) = 6 r(r−1) . Now, suppose GBT (g, g , g ) is an element of f , where g, g , and g are groups in S. Let San = GBT (g, g , g ) + Lap(λ) be a ZKP mechanism which adds random noise selected from Lap(λ) distribution to the output of GBT (g, g , g ) in order to achieve ZKP. Our goal here is to come up with the right λ to achieve a predefined level of ZKP.
Based on the definition of ZKP, one should first know the sample complexity of the GBT function. For this, without any change in semantics, we will express GBT so that it computes an average rather than a fraction of two counts. Then, using the Hoeffding inequality (cf. [28] ) we compute the sample complexity of GBT .
Expressing GBT .
In addition to regular node attributes (if any), we introduce |S| 2 new boolean attributes, one for each group pair in S. We denote each new attribute by upper-case I indexed by a grouppair id. Each attribute I gigj (I ij for short) is a boolean vector of dimension |g i | · |g j |, where each dimension corresponds to a possible edge between g i and g j . A node u in graph G(V, E) will have I ij (u)[vw] = 1, where v ∈ g i and w ∈ g j , if {(u, v), (u, w), (v, w)} ⊆ E, and I ij (u)[vw] = 0, otherwise. Note that, we have u = v, v = w, and w = u. For each triplet of groups g i , g j , and g k we can verify that:
|L| Therefore, the GBT (g i , g j , g k ) measure can be viewed as the average of
ZKP Mechanism. Let G = (V, E) be a graph enriched with boolean attributes as explained above. We would like to determine the value of λ > 0 for the Lap(λ) distribution which will be used to add random noise to GBT (g, g , g ) included in f . For this, first we compute the sample complexity of GBT to be able to use Proposition 4.1 and establish an appropriate value for λ.
Let T be a randomized algorithm in agg k , the class of randomized algorithms that operates on an input graph G. To randomly sample a graph G, algorithm T would uniformly select k = k(n)/t random nodes from V , read their attributes, and retrieve all edges 4 incident to these k sample nodes.
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With this sampling, the nodes in the groups of S and the edges between them would be randomly sampled as well. Let us assume that we have a sample of each group and edges between groups, and a sample of group g is denoted as g k . Then, algorithm T would approximate GBT using sampled graph data. For the sample complexity of GBT (g, g , g ), since we expressed it as averages, we can use the Hoeffding inequality as follows;
where |L k | is the number of all possible valid triangles between sample groups g k , g k , and g k .
From this and Definition 4.3, we have that the GBT function has δ, 2e −2|L k |δ 2 -sample complexity with respect to agg k . Now we make the following substitutions in the formula of Proposition 4.1:
∆(GBT (g, g , g )) = 4 Clearly, only non-dangling incident edges, whose both end nodes have been sampled, will be retrieved. 5 For other possible methods of graph sampling see for example [7] .
Similarly to DP, we set λ, the Laplace noise scale, to be proportional to "the error" as can be measured in the ZKP method by the sum of the sensitivity ∆(GBT ) and sampling error δ, and inversely proportional to the ZKP privacy level. Regarding δ, we can consider for instance δ = 
Thus, we have that by adding noise randomly selected from Lap 1 6
San will be + 2e
Example 3. Let graph G be a social graph with ten million participants/nodes (|V | = n = 10, 000, 000), and g, g , and g be three node groups in S. Suppose that the minimum group size in S is r = 100, and we would like to report GBT (g, g , g ). To privately release GBT measures, a randomized algorithm T would uniformly select k nodes and approximate the value of GBT (g, g , g ) using sample data.
The actual value of function GBT (g, g , g ) is computed on G. Suppose that the number of all possible valid triangles between group samples g k , g k , and g k is |L k | = 300, 000. Let (δ, β) be the sample complexity of GBT (g, g , g ) where
√ 300, 000 = 0.0149. To compare this result with Differential Privacy (DP) method in [4, 20] , in order to get 0.1-DP privacy, we would have λ = ∆(GBT )/0.1 = 0.0006. As it is clear from the computation, the noise scale in DP method is quite smaller. While the ZKP noise is sufficient to protect all the evidence of participation.
EVALUATION
In our methods, the amount of noise added to the output is independent of the database, and it only depends on the function we compute and their sensitivities. Therefore, the following analysis is valid for any database.
Parameters Affecting Noise Scale
Sampling error δ is an important factor specifying λ based on the formula of noise scale λ = ∆(f )+δ . The error in turn has reverse connection with the size of group samples and therefore, with the sample size and size of the database graph. Recall that throughout the paper we considered the error to be δ = Fig. 3 illustrates the relationship between the noise scale λ and the parameter |L k |. In this figure we assumed that the minimum group size is r = 100, and the ZKP-level is 0.1. The figure shows that as parameter |L k | decreases from five hundred thousand to one thousand the noise scale increases non-linearly to the amounts that are not practical in our setting. Therefore, our proposed ZKP mechanism is perfect for big databases with large sample sizes. However, even |L k | = 500, 000 implies some sample group sizes around k = 80, which is reasonable in social graphs with only millions of participants, provided that the groups include some linchpin nodes that build a dense subgraph. (recall that |L k | is the number of triangles between group samples). Hence, we conclude that the proposed ZKP mechanism works well with small dense data graphs as well as large graphs.
The Noise
The analysis in this section aims to provide a better understanding of the amount of noise added to outputs.
The cumulative distribution function of Laplace distribution in an interval [−z, z] is computed as follows, P r(−z ≤ x ≤ z) = Let pr = P r(|x| ≤ z). Value z for a specified cumulative probability pr can be calculated using the above equation as z = −λ · ln(1 − pr) = − ∆(f ) + δ · ln(1 − pr). Figure 4 illustrates the maximum absolute noise z as a function of cumulative probability pr for three different values of δ when = 0.1 and ∆(f ) = 0.0001. Each point (pr, z) on the curve for a given δ means that pr percent of the time the random noise has an absolute value of at most z.
For example, for δ = 0.02 we have that 50% of the time the absolute value of noise is at most 0.14, and 75% of the time it is at most 0.28.
CONCLUSIONS
We addressed zero-knowledge private methods for releasing group-based triangle (GBT) measures for social networks. The application of our technique is crucial in order to have a secure public release of such graph measures. We introduced methods to compute the ZKP parameters, specifically the sample complexity. We showed that the proposed technique 
